: 
Nico Krisch Postdoctoral Fellow, Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, Germany
"Imperial International Law"
International law is often thought to depend for its effectiveness on a certain balance of power in international affairs. In contrast, dominant actors and hegemons are assumed to turn away from law and to politics to conduct their foreign relations. This corresponds to an often idealized contrast between international law and international politics, one being the site of reason and justice, the other that of brute power. On the other hand, critical legal scholars have long argued for a realist perspective on international law, exposing the instrumentality of the law as a tool of powerful actors. Here, the difference between international law and politics often wanes.
In this paper, I try to go beyond these positions by analyzing the multiple
ways in which dominant states interact with international law.
Drawing on international relations theory, I develop a model of this interaction,
which I then illustrate and refine with examples from historical cases
of hegemony and current US dominance. The typical pattern of interaction,
I argue, is one of instrumentalization of and withdrawal from international
law, coupled with a substitution of domestic legal tools for international
law in many areas. The latter element, substitution, is quite characteristic
of this interaction, and it is most pronounced in empires, which is why
I call the pattern "imperial international law".
The analysis of the relationship between the three elements of the interaction should enable us to gain a better understanding of the uses of international law for the pursuit of power and of the obstacles it poses to this pursuit. One may conclude from this analysis that, in a world characterized by power disparities, international law eventually depends on its always fragile, precarious position between the demands of the powerful and the contemporary ideals of justice.
